

Bureaucracy and Transition: Some Reflections on Redemocratization and Politics-Administration Dichotomy

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Being one of the resurgent democracies of the contemporary times, the Philippine government urgently needs bureaucratic reforms. Reorganization within the bureaucracy may be the first preoccupation of the new regime towards reform but this entails a host of related issues that may in the long run defeat the real purpose of bureaucratic reform. The politics-administration dichotomy proposition provides an ethical basis for the behavior of bureaucracy in a democratic setting but it seems inappropriate because of uncertainty as to its logical validity and relevance. In the quest for a proper alternative that would "depoliticize" and reorient the bureaucracy, resurgent democracies may find themselves opting for a reconceptualization of the politics-administration dichotomy proposition, ignoring some of the premises that do not have "empirical warrant" and recasting it along the lines and traditions of liberalism, liberal democracy, and political sociology.

Introduction

The concern for bureaucratic reform among societies undergoing redemocratization in the aftermath of the collapse of authoritarian regimes has become a subject of interest in recent years, as newly installed democracies in Asia and Latin America, among others, come to grips with the tensions of transition. According to Donald Share, "democratization from authoritarian rule has been one of the most intensely studied topics of the 1980s" and these incorporate a wide array of issues that range from the erosion of authoritarian rule, the process of democratic regime change, the consolidation of new democracies, and the procedure and substance of democratic rule.¹

The problematic of transition among resurgent democracies in such countries as the Philippines, Brazil, Argentina, and to some extent that of South Korea,² has brought about intricate problems and issues as to the nature and character of the bureaucracy in the redemocratization process. While new democracies are generally confronted with a formidable agenda in their adventure towards national reconstruction,³ a major dilemma that has surfaced in the praxis of the redemocratization process is the issue of reforming bureaucracies that served authoritarian governments and how to make them adjust to democratic conditions.

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To be sure, authoritarian regimes, in their efforts to preserve and consolidate power, may have disturbed traditionally recognized values upheld in the landscape of public administration, from such procedural advocacies as efficiency, effectiveness and economy, to more substantial aspirations of civil service neutrality, public accountability, merit and fitness and security of tenure. On the whole, bureaucracies in authoritarian dispensations may have found themselves as both willing and unwilling accomplices in perpetuating dictatorial regimes, as they went about playing dark, Machiavellian games to ensure patronage and survival under a climate of repression and uncertainty. Paradoxically, bureaucracies may have likewise served as active partners in entrenching the regime by assuming a dominant role in government policy making, and becoming power elites along the lines of what O'Donnell has caricatured as bureaucrat-authoritarian states or of shady variants of corporatist and techno-bureaucratic configurations.⁴

Thus, as redemocratization takes shape within a resurgent democracy, the new dispensation is confronted with numerous and complex problems of transition, laboring under the predicament of installing a new socio-political and economic order that requires swift and judicious intervention within the context of a pluralist setting. The new government is faced with the dilemma of warding off threats of restoration of authoritarianism by redoubts of the old regime who have been displaced from positions of power and influence, as well as the resurgence of leftist and rightist opposition groups that may see the opportunity to seize power as the new government wrestles with the rigors of transition. The path towards redemocratization is laced with a burgeoning number of competing demands from various forces, and significantly, the constituency that installed the new government to power may now be flushed with excitement and expectations of better opportunities, presumably more than what the government can provide, given the limitations or constraints of both the democratic processes and of resources.

Conceivably, in this scenario, bureaucracy, the mechanism by which public policy is to be implemented would have to assume an active and prominent role, since it serves as the vehicle by which government services are to be delivered. Bureaucracy as understood in the context of this paper refers to the administrative system of the state, or of government, which is tasked with the functions of administering, enforcing and implementing public policy derived from the demands and needs articulated by the constituency and given substance and formality by the policy-making body, in this case, the legislature.

Unfortunately, a bureaucracy that may have been overly politicized during the era of authoritarianism may not have the appropriate attitude, outlook or predisposition in dealing with the magnitude of such a task. The

bureaucracy, for all intents and purposes, may have ceased to be a mediator of conflicting political interests during the past regime, and may now characteristically be unsure or unconvinced of its own neutrality in dispensing public goods and services. The predicament is aggravated if the society does not have a firm tradition of insulating bureaucracy from the pressures of politics, and where involvement of bureaucrats in active politics are fairly accepted and recognized. Moreover, the problem is exacerbated if the new government, in its pursuit of power, have attracted bureaucrats to its cause as silent partners in toppling the authoritarian regime. Unwittingly, the new dispensation may have, on its own, enhance the politicalization of the bureaucracy, as a matter of strategy and political pragmatism, and which now must be tamed and rationalized, if implementation of public policy under its wings is to be undertaken responsibly. A related problem that emerges here readily is that of public accountability. The administrative system under an authoritarian rule may have acquired the predilection, following the values of the political leadership, to be less inclined to observe accountability principles, which in the past may have allowed unmitigated power and control over the disposition of public funds or in the indiscriminate pursuit of regulatory functions. This state of affairs have naturally opened the floodgates for negative bureaucratic behavior, paving occasions for bureaupathological commission of rapacity and misfeasance, the toleration of inefficiency, red tape and incompetence, and the waning of responsiveness to public needs and demands.

While these may be treated as passing aberrations inherent in the character of authoritarian rules, resurgent democracies bear the brunt and challenge of institutionalizing reforms to regain public confidence. It is therefore this very nature and peculiarity of the bureaucracy that must be redirected and infused with the renewal of some system of values and moral philosophy to allow the new regime to absorb the pressures exerted by the redemocratization process.

Along these lines, the most appealing philosophy that appears to be relevant among resurgent democracies, given the dilemmas predicated above, would be a return to the ideal but unimaginative proposition of separating the world of administration from that of politics, or what has been both affectionately and contemptuously labelled by the academic community in American Public Administration as "politics-administration dichotomy."⁵ In spite of the continued assault by American scholars impugning the validity of this proposition during the past two decades,⁶ the concept continues to provoke renewed interest, haunting the sensibilities of pragmatists who find any such compartmentalization as viable only in theory, and in structural segmentation (e.g., the advocacy of the separation of powers among the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government under a presiden-

tial form), but certainly not validated in the actual exercise and experience of political and "administrative" dynamics.

As a fitting contribution to that off and on debate, this paper examines the validity and relevance of the politics-administration dichotomy proposition under the conditions of redemocratization. This may imply a return to fundamentals which, in essence, characterizes redemocratization, particularly those systems of government that adhere to the presidential form. As such, this study will be divided into three parts: the first section reviews the nature and functions of bureaucracies in the modern state, particularly as to its own role in the interaction process of government with the constituency. Essentially, the state performs service and regulatory functions using the bureaucracy as its vehicle in discharging these responsibilities. In this discussion, the paper incorporates passing mention on the types or manner of transitions that mediate the redemocratization process. This sets the perspectives for the second part which deals with a reexamination of the politics-administration dichotomy theory construct. This portion presents a synoptic view of the proposition and some of the issues raised against it. The last part aspires to come up with recommendations as to how resurgent democracies are to appreciate the politics-administration dichotomy proposition, whether it is at all relevant in the quest for bureaucratic reform, whether it should be reformulated to suit the demands and realities of resurgent democracies, particularly those in the Third World, or whether it should be dismissed as a trivial and academic wishful thinking that does not offer much in explaining the ramifications of the polity.

The Nature of the State and of Bureaucracy

The literature on the nature of the state and of bureaucracy is, to begin with, a bewildering labyrinth of propositions and premises that find antecedents from Plato's concept of the "Republic" to Marx's critique of the state being an instrument of exploitation perpetuated by the ruling class. These extend to Weber's notion of large and complicated organizations which he called as "bureaucracies." The conflict of interpretation has become even more staggering, with philosophers like Hobbes and Locke indulging into premises as to the evolution of the modern state. To be sure, inquiries and treatises on the modern state and bureaucracy have grown too vast to be captured in a single paper.

In an incisive essay on political theory and the modern state, David Held points out that modern Western political thought has considered the notion of the state as:

...an impersonal and privileged legal or constitutional order with the capability of administering and controlling a given territory.⁷

Simple as it may appear, this notion however is challenged by various perspectives on the state and state power, as different interpretations, diverse and fluid, attempted to present varying perspectives that reflect the influence of the period with which these interpretations appeared.

Held offers a convenient typology, saying that political analysis of the modern state can be classified into four strands or traditions. These are: 1) Liberalism, which focused on questions of sovereignty and citizenship, preoccupied, among others, with the notion of order, and is principally represented by the thoughts of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Hobbes considered the modern state as a creature of consent between the sovereign and the governed in a society perversely viewed as hostile (i.e., the state of nature), while Locke saw the state as a medium designed to preserve and maintain law and order at home, and protection against aggression from abroad; 2) Liberal democracy which considered the significance of political accountability as associated with the need for the political apparatus to ensure accountability of the governors to the governed, and has been captured in the works of Jeremy Bentham, James Stuart Mill, John Stuart Mill and Jean Jacques Rousseau; 3) Marxism which rejected "the terms of reference of both liberalism and liberal democracy" and concentrated upon class structure and the forces of political coercion. This tradition grew from Marx's notion of the state as an instrument of oppression, and found acceptance in the works of Lenin and Trotsky; and 4) Political sociology which emphasized institutional mechanisms of the state and the system of administration of nation states. This tradition is represented by such scholars as Max Weber and succeeding thinkers belonging to what Held casually calls as the Anglo-American pluralist schools.⁸

Obviously, contemporary political theory abounds with a complex of persuasions articulating different notions and thinking on the nature of the state, and which we may have failed to capture using Held's typology. The important consideration however is that the state represents the embodiments and the collective articulation of a given community in the direction and management of its affairs.

For Max Weber, the state is a "human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory."⁹ He argues that the state is really a relation of men dominating men supported by means of legitimate violence, and that through this, the state presides over a situation in which the dominance of some prevails over the others. This dominance however "is the consequence of the competition to gain power" within the context of legitimacy. In discussing the concept of legitimacy, he identifies three modes of authority by which domination is engendered: through traditional authority, charismatic domination by a leader, and domination by a rational-legal authority chosen on the basis of rules. Weber expressed his preference with the last form of authority, which he referred to as the "pure" or ideal type. In this form, he prescribed a

bureaucratic organization to be the most logical and efficient mechanism by which a rational-legal type of leadership can be supported.¹⁰

The Marxist perspective of course would follow a different understanding: the state, represented by bourgeoisie leadership, is but an instrument for managing the common affairs of the ruling class, or the bourgeoisie, and that the state perpetuates a hierarchical class structure to protect the interests of the ruling class.¹¹

It is not the purpose of this paper however to figure in that debate although we certainly acknowledge and recognize the significance of the issue. What is attempted however is to understand the function of the modern state and bureaucracy, and their implications for resurgent democracies and the quest for political and administrative reform.

Bureaucracy, to begin with, has been identified with the modern state and governmental organizations. While the term has been understood in a variety of contexts, the most popular meaning attached to bureaucratic organizations has been government organizations performing administrative functions, and which, through the years, have acquired a pejorative connotation, generally associated with inefficiency, incompetence, corrupt behavior or other forms of negative practices.

The latter interpretation however is unfortunate even if there is a ring of truth behind it. For Max Weber, who popularized the term, bureaucracies represented large, complex organizations characterized by "precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal costs." Weber, therefore, conceived bureaucratic institutions as the most technically efficient form of organization possible.¹² The realities of government however have not allowed much of the Weberian model. Bureaucratic organizations have thus been interpreted widely as both a rational system of organization in one instance, and a case of administrative inefficiency in another.¹³

In detailing the various concepts attached to bureaucratic organizations, Albrow offers several interpretations. He identifies seven concepts that range from bureaucracy being treated as rational organizations, as administrative inefficiency, as a rule by officials, as public administration, as administration by officials, as organizations, and as a way of capturing the essence of the state in modern society.¹⁴

In all these however, the most dominant form of interpretation that pervades has been the association with the administrative system of the state, and which Wilson used as his point of departure in 1887 in characterizing or

isolating the study of public administration. Bureaucracy therefore is conceived as the mechanism or the medium by which the functions of the state are undertaken in civilized societies as derived from the character of public policy formulated by the governmental system in general. Thus, Taylor Cole, as cited by Albrow, describes bureaucracy as referring to "a group of human beings or employees who are performing definite functions considered essential by a community."¹⁵

What are these functions then? Essentially, they cover a wide variety of duties that involve the functions of the state or of government. Again, the literature is markedly filled with varying interpretations. Musgrave and Musgrave identify the functions of public policy, particularly those pertaining to fiscal matters as those involving such mass of concerns as: allocation of resources and wealth, which has distinct implications on the provision of social goods and services, and the failure of market mechanisms to provide them; the distribution functions, which likewise cover redistribution of wealth and income; employment and price stability, and such other roles as growth and modernization which are generally attributed as functions of the modern state.¹⁶ These authors however gave emphasis on these functions in the sense that they addressed themselves to fiscal policy and the intervention of the state. Still, these identified functions are relatively considered as important duties of the state, and are largely operationalized through the mechanism of the bureaucracy which may adopt such policies and guidelines to ensure the fulfillment of these functions.

On the other hand, Downs considered bureaucracies as organizations performing social functions in modern societies that must be accomplished by non-market oriented organizations. He argues logically that "some important social functions cannot be performed adequately by market-oriented organizations because they involve external costs and benefits." He proceeds to identify these as those activities that provide indivisible benefits, i.e., social benefits which everyone enjoys regardless of whether they pay for it directly or not (e.g., services for peace and order, defense, health, etc.), those involving redistribution of incomes, regulation of monopolies, protection of consumers and the general public, compensation for aggregate instabilities or deficiencies in a market economy, conduct of research, creation of framework of law and order, and maintenance of government, among others.¹⁷

In the study of the nation-states among contemporary Latin American states, Kaplan assigns seven distinct functions to the state. These range from the use and regulation of available resources, distribution of goods, services and incomes; the creation and administration of public services; production, buying and selling of goods and services; direct investment and support to private sector; maintenance of employment and income; public financing of production and contemporary policies.¹⁸

These perspectives are generally based from the viewpoint of capitalist societies, and therefore differ from Marxist interpretations of the state and the bureaucracy. As suggested earlier, the Marxist perspective saw the state as not representing the general interest any more than civil society, and this holds true for the bureaucracy as part of the state. For Marx, the bureaucracy "purports to advance the common welfare, but under the cloak of universality, it actually further its own."¹⁹ Definitely, the Marxist view offers a provocative and interesting conceptualization of the state and of the bureaucracy which may have far reaching implications on the models of governance and economic structures pursued by resurgent democracies. It is definitely tempting to explore prospects along these lines, especially with the case of Nicaragua under the Ortega regime, which for all intents and purposes may be treated as a resurgent democracy in spite of views to the contrary adopted by the United States. Undoubtedly, a country like Nicaragua which had liberated itself from a previously authoritarian regime (e.g., the Somoza dispensation) will have similar problems of bureaucratic reform, will encounter typical problems of reconstruction, and will have to rebuild its society within what its present leaders would view as adhering to a democratic framework, even if the policy and strategies may not agree with prescriptions of Western democracies.²⁰

Parenthetically, Nicaragua's alternative path may be considered as a model for resurgent democracies, and its success in determining its destiny based on an independent foreign policy may have some implications on resurgent democracies like the Philippines, Brazil or Argentina which continues to pursue societal reconstruction along Western capitalist lines. But then again, that would be another issue that may well be considered in another study.

The Functions of the State and Bureaucracy

As considered in the previous discussion, the state and the bureaucracy performs a variety of functions inherent in the character of the state. As a way of consolidating these interpretations, we offer a model in Figure 1 describing four major functions of the state or of government under democratic regimes following the ones characterized by Musgrave and Musgrave, Downs, and Kaplan.²¹ These functions, as treated here reflect an aggregate of what has been suggested, and is presented in relation to the environmental context where government is depicted in an active interaction with the citizenry. These functions include: 1) the provision and delivery of goods, services and opportunities, which distinctly cover the government's service function and takes the character of the allocation, redistribution and social goods dispensing roles we have previously highlighted. These social goods, along with services and opportunities may take the nature of diverse sectoral needs along social and economic lines such as health, education, housing, employment opportunities and such other goods deserved by the populace; 2) the regulatory




Figure 1. A Model for Describing the Functions of Government and Its Interaction with the Citizenry

functions of government, which again, involve the allocation, redistribution and stabilization functions of Musgrave and Musgrave, as well as such responsibilities as protection of the public from monopolies or other market operations mentioned by Downs and Kaplan. The functions under this classification would include maintenance and enforcement of peace and order, regulation of market operations, licensing and permits of various forms of economic or non-economic activities, and similar situations where state intervention is required and deemed incumbent to protect the welfare of citizens, the integrity of the state, the national patrimony and resources and their exploitation, and national sovereignty; 3) the function of extracting support from the constituency, which may include aspects of taxation, cooperation, participation in government activities, civil obedience, and involvement in electoral processes, and similar pleas for support and cooperation sought by the state from the citizenry; and 4) the information dissemination and communication functions, which the state, under a democratic regime, must accomplish to ensure that the constituency is knowledgeable on the conduct and affairs of government. While this function may not have been given the importance it deserves in the agenda of government responsibilities under normal conditions, a resurgent democracy would do well to strengthen this component because it is this aspect of government operations that engenders interaction with the citizenry. The important feature of this component or aspect of government functions is that information flowing to the public from the state must match the services extended. If the information and communication component from government to the public is weak or inadequate, the delivery of services may be impaired, since the public may not be prepared to avail of the benefits. Likewise, an uninformed constituency may not find itself sympathetic to government's regulatory acts, or may fail to respond favorably to the state's pleas for support. On the other hand, if there is too much of information on goods and services more than what can actually be delivered, there exists the possibility of the citizenry becoming frustrated because their expectations, raised by government through public announcements, are not matched by availability of actual goods or services.

The above functions are referred to in this paper collectively as the government's *feedforward function*. They represent the government's discharge of duty in a manner of delivery of services, extracting support, enforcing regulation and state control, and dissemination of information. As the model depicts, it is incumbent for the government to derive the nature and character of these functions based on articulated demands, needs and aspirations of the public brought to the state through the various media. These are now processed in the bureaucracy or other government institutions such as the legislative branch, and given substance in the form of policies - laws and enactments, rules and regulations, and such other legislations, depending on the nature of the service, activity or action.

When these are received by the public, the latter forms values, sentiments, attitudes or judgments which become the bases for public opinion and may result in some form of favorable or negative individual or collective behavior. The citizenry thus, may react to the feedforward functions of government as individuals or as a collectivity, as part of interest groups or aggrupations. The behavior may now come in the form of: 1) availment of the goods, services and opportunities; 2) compliance with government's control policies (e.g., civil obedience); 3) responding to the government's call for support (e.g., payment of taxes, support during elections for the administration's party, etc.). In effect this may also be understood as consent and compliance, although there are occasions when citizens extend support to its government not out of servile obedience to regulatory policies, but as a matter of duty or perception of need; and 4) articulation of citizen expectations on government, which characterize the people's initiative to change, amend, or reject the government's policy. The matter of identifying these reactions from the public as a result of the government's feedforward functions can be referred to as the *feedback functions* of government, in the sense that it is the duty of the state to process citizen reactions to government activities.

An important matter that should be considered here is that the process operates within a pluralist context, and while the interaction process is made to appear as simplistic for the sake of analysis, there exists within the delivery of each feedforward lines a complex of interest articulation, influence of pressure groups, opposition or support, or similar demands that work within the polity and the outside or international environment. Similarly, the feedback lines are replete with a complex of variables and factors as they proceed back to government.

Among resurgent democracies, the feedforward lines become even more numerous, since the task of reconstruction is undertaken simultaneously with delivery of services, regulation of behavior within the boundaries of democratic principles, the extraction of support and continuing communication with the citizenry. The new dispensation is faced with the agenda of having to shape new policies and a government structure that would be consistent with its philosophies, while retaining the basic provision on government services.

Transition from Authoritarian Rule to Resurgent Democracies

It should be noted that a similar interaction process depicted in Fig. 1 may be used to describe governmental functions under authoritarian regimes, except that the system of exchange may have been disrupted because of the nature of governance. For all intents and purposes, the authoritarian regime may have ignored the functions of service delivery and extraction of support, and may have, in some respects, manipulated information dissemination. The

focus may have been to regulate or control the behavior of the populace to entrench the authoritarian dispensation. Consequently, the feedback lines may have not been used to understand the sentiments of the populace, leading to a breakdown of communication between the citizenry and the state. Delivery of services may have been restricted, and which may have resulted in deprivation of the poorer sectors of society that do not have access to the leadership. Thus, as the contradictions sharpened, with a growing sector of the community becoming disillusioned with the regime, the feedback lines are now replaced with hostility, alienation, non-compliance with government policies, civil disobedience and other expressions of dissent. Given these conditions, the state opts to institutionalize itself, employing new systems of domination and exploitation. Kaplan describes this process in the Latin American experience as a case where the state acquires "an apparatus of government, administration, and coercion," supported by an armed forces that performed under "the watchwords of professionalism, bureaucratization, loyalty and subordination to civil power."²² While there may be banner goals such as growth and modernization, "the population was left with its problems: the frustration of its needs and hopes of participation and the reduction of its options and possibilities for progress."²³ The important theoretical premise here is that there needs to be a matching or balance of the feedforward functions in a manner that citizens consent, approval and perceptions are considered, with the feedback lines used as bases of feedforward policy and of government activities.

At the crucial moment when feedback responses from the citizens are ignored, there may occur a heightening of dissent and disapproval on government's actions. The response of the constituency may initially be passive, but continuing repression may force some sectors to take an active role in either instituting reforms or in causing the rupture of the regime. As disaffection with the government becomes widespread, the withdrawal of support and compliance with a mass number of the citizenry paves the way towards either reform in the authoritarian regime or its collapse, and becomes the impetus for change in leadership which may foster the redemocratization process.

Share characterizes transitions to democracy from authoritarianism into four basic types: 1) incremental democratization, where transition is brought about by the authoritarian leaders tolerating democratic political change, and refraining from active stewardship over it; 2) transition through transaction, where authoritarian leaders actively participate in the process of change hoping thereby to control and limit such change, or to forestall distasteful change; 3) transition through protracted revolutionary struggle; and 4) transition through regime rupture.²⁴ The first two types are what he calls "consensual transitions" where the process of democratic reform enjoys support

from the authoritarian regime. The case of Brazil and to some extent, that of South Korea may be classified under the first type. The second type on the other hand is typified by the experience of resurgent democracies like Argentina, where the authoritarian ruler experienced loss of legitimacy and turned over the power to the democratic opposition. Evidently, consensual transitions are brought about by a perception of the authoritarian rulers of their loss of legitimacy, prompting them to turn over the power to the democratic opposition. The increasing incidences of civil disobedience, generally expressed in terms of dissent through protest rallies, demonstration, and similar vehicles may characterize the waning of support. In this case, the feedback activity generated from the citizenry serves as basis for conceding the need for democratic reforms. The third and fourth categories on the other hand involves what Share calls as "non-consensual transitions" where the authoritarian ruler has practically lost capacity to govern, and where the populace take an even more active role to bring about the collapse of the regime. The case of Nicaragua and the Sandinistas, in overthrowing the Somoza regime may serve as an example for transitions undertaken through protracted revolutionary struggle. Again, this may be disputed, and may largely depend on the character or appreciation of the form of government presently pursued by the Ortega government. The last classification finds a good example in the Philippines with the takeover of the Aquino government. The Marcos regime has definitely failed to mirror disaffection either because it has chosen to ignore the feedback lines, or it believed that continuing repression in the form of control may be adequate to forestall open confrontation.

Bureaucratic Reform in Resurgent Democracies

The redemocratization process in most resurgent democracies generally begins with a remapping of the power centers of the polity in the discharge of government functions. Viola and Mainwaring stress "that transitions following regime collapse entail a marked, though unstable, redefinition of political rules."²⁵ Consensual transitions, if there is will towards political reform, will relatively follow a similar pattern although less dramatic and encompassing.

Transitions to democratic governments would necessarily begin with a revision of the power structure that has been characteristically concentrated in the authoritarian leadership, and which must now be reallocated. The activities of institutions operating within the authoritarian dispensation - the bureaucracy, the judiciary and the legislative, and even the military establishment - may have been reduced to serve as cosmetic and servile partners of the regime in its adventure of domination and exploitation, and in entrenching the ruling elite. As a consequence, the system of checks and

balances and the principles of separation of powers of independent and co-equal institutions may have been forsaken, resulting in the authoritarian regime's inability to rule and respond rationally and responsibly to the demands of the populace. It is possible that a certain degree of arbitrariness in interpreting public opinion may have prevailed in the conduct of the affairs of government, even with such lofty visions of development and modernization.

Under the authoritarian system, bureaucracy, the institution deemed to implement and enforce policies and programs of the regime, would enjoy some form of power and control. The bureaucracy may be placed in a ritual of subservience, enjoying enormous power, in the sense that accountability is observed only towards the authoritarian leadership. While this may serve as occasion for the untrammelled exercise of technical competence and expertise, the practice may have also degenerated into an overly powerful bureaucracy whose consciousness is methodologically addressed towards coopting with the leadership as a source of power, survival and patronage. In this sense, public administration, generally considered as having some distaste for the disorderliness of liberal democracy, becomes politicized, and drawn into an allegiance with the regime. This perhaps typifies the cumbersome concept of O'Donnell's bureaucrat-authoritarian state where the bureaucracy acquires a major influence on the direction of the affairs of the state. Citing O'Donnell and Collier, Cariño identifies the features of this configuration:

These systems are 'excluding' and emphatically non-democratic. Central actors in the dominant coalition include high-level technocrats-military and civilian within and outside the state-working in close association with foreign capital. This new elite eliminates electoral competition and severely controls the political participation of the popular sector...²⁶

Bureaucratic reform among resurgent democracies would thus have to collapse this power structure by re-institutionalizing a substantive system of authority relationships that enshrines and operationalizes the balance of power, the observance of accountability to the constituency, the use of the electoral process as a means of acquiring legitimacy, the adoption of liberalization policies which would provide the exercise of basic freedoms, and the advocacy of independent branches of government that are co-equal. The years of authoritarianism, particularly among bureaucrat-authoritarian states, have given the bureaucracy the influence, power and even solitude in the design of policy and in their implementation. As Cariño maintains in a discussion of civil servants in an authoritarian state, bureaucrats would tend to engage in such behaviors as routine performance of duty, empire-building, technocratic action, corruption, or alternatively, covert or overt dissent and committed action.²⁷ The last would be an interesting option, but given severe levels of repression, and the motivation to survive a hostile environment, the bureaucracy may find itself more inclined to the first four, since they mean

the continued exercise of power and influence.

Resurgent democracies then, must begin bureaucratic reform by breaking down the autonomization of the bureaucracy that has been nourished by the authoritarian regime, in the manner that prevailing power centers have to be collapsed. This is an important agenda that must come simultaneously with national reconstruction. As Kaplan observes in his studies on trends of nation-states in Latin America, "the excessive accumulation of power and authority in the central government, its executive nucleus and the high level techno-bureaucracy weaken the legislative and judicial power as well as public opinion..."²⁸ It is thus important to locate the role of the bureaucracy in the redemocratization milieu. Figure 2 depicts a model of interaction between three independent branches of government under a presidential form. In this alternative, we find a sharing of power in the state which is provided by some ideal system of procedures. As shown, the political system defines public policies, and translates these in terms of enactments or laws, using inputs received from the environment and given flesh by different sectors of society which comprise such components as pressure and interest groups, political parties, and opposition or support groups to certain demands and aspirations. These are essentially culled from public opinion, following the pattern described earlier in Figure 1. These enactments are shaped and brought to the administrative system (i.e., the executive branch and the bureaucracy that support it), which then fashions out implementing guidelines, and goes about implementing, enforcing or executing the mandates. These mandates cover a wide range of activities that have been classified under Figure 1, and therefore may include delivery of goods and services, regulation, extracting of support and information dissemination. The judiciary, aside from its distinct functions of adjudication, serves as an interpreter of the validity, or constitutionality of the acts. As the effects are received by the citizenry, the response may be viewed in the manner depicted under Figure 1. Stripped of the nuances and vagaries that permeate the political process, Figure 2 depicts a clear-cut separation of powers and assignment of roles, prescribing the processing of political inputs as part of the role of the legislative or political system. Along these lines, the administrative and judiciary systems are presumed to exercise a certain degree of neutrality. Admittedly, the model is simplistic in that it does not consider other variables that pervade the environment (e.g., the influence of politicians in the implementation of laws), but it somehow shows the distinct features of the tradition described as the politics-administration dichotomy concept of the Wilson era.

In arguing for the development of what he calls as a "science of administration," Woodrow Wilson advocated the separation of the world of politics from that of administration. Thus, in his seminal contribution to the study of Public Administration, which was to become an enduring tradition in the disciplinary field, Wilson pointed out succinctly that:




Figure 2. The Relationship of the Different Branches of Government: A Model for Politics-Administration Dichotomy

The field of administration is a field of business. It is removed from the hurry and strife of politics. It at most points stand apart even from the debatable ground of constitutional study. It is part of political life only as the methods of the counting-house are a part of the life of society....²⁹

This view reinforces the position that the "essence of a political system is its ability to accomodate and synthesize pressures that otherwise would be incapable of accomodation," while the administrative system serves as the mechanism that is to implement policies that were previously legitimized through accepted political channels, i.e., political parties, interest groups, legislatures, presidents, governors and mayors.³⁰

Politics-Administration Dichotomy: The Myth Refuses to Die

The appeal of the politics-administration dichotomy proposition, as an advocacy for government, administration and the bureaucracy, was developed during a spirited era of reform in the United States. While the proposition has been markedly associated with Wilson, and later reinforced by Goodnow and Willoughby, the concept drew its appeal from the context of civil service reform in the American government, which in the 1880s languished under the dilemma of the patronage system that characterized Jacksonian democracy. Previous to this, the tradition that prevailed was that public service should be democratized and opened to all segments of society. There was no need for permanence in the bureaucracy because the duties of federal jobs were relatively simple and did not require experience. Unfortunately, this view served as the watershed for the development of the spoils system and allowed politicians to interfere with the administrative processes of the executive branch, with the civil service becoming vulnerable to changes in political leadership. Jacksonian democracy essentially perceived government offices and the appointment of positions therein as largely based on patronage and on political loyalty. The effect was the development of a bureaucracy that was politicized, owing allegiance to a political party, and having a personal stake in the outcome of the electoral process. The passage of the Pendleton Act in 1883 in the United States however saw the development of a civil service insulated from political control and partisanship, and is deemed neutral with the appointments to positions based on merit.³¹

It was thus only logical for Wilson to provide the moral and ethical basis in his 1887 article for this vision, except that his philosophy embodied a broader and larger framework that grew out of the simple perspectives of civil service reform. He argued that administration and its study must "rescue executive methods from the confusion and costliness of empirical experiment and set them upon foundations laid deep in stable principle." Thus, he continues emphatically:

It is for this reason that we must regard civil-reform in its present stages as but a prelude to a fuller administrative reform. We are now rectifying methods of appointment; we must go on to adjust executive functions more fitly and to prescribe better methods of executive organization for what is to follow...

Let me expand a little of what I have said of the province of administration. Most important to be observed is the truth already so much and so fortunately insisted upon by our civil-service reformers; namely, that administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are not political questions. Although politics sets the task for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices.

Wilson's views may thus be seen as the forerunner of the technocratic state in the most pristine form, in the sense that the functions of government and the execution of public policy are entrusted to technicians of the administration and the economy. It likewise follows from the Weberian conception of the bureaucracy which operated on the basis of technical competence and capabilities.

No matter how ideal and precarious the proposition may appear, the philosophy for separation of politics and administration served to reinforce the value premise of American liberal democracy, particularly on the segmentation of the different branches of government which are supposed to be co-equal, following some system of separation of power, check and balance, and structurally and constitutionally compartmentalized in this manner. It was thus not too difficult for the politics-administration dichotomy theory construct to capture the imagination of succeeding scholars in the field of government. Goodnow articulated this point saying that "there are, in all governmental systems, two primary or ultimate functions of government viz., the expression of the will of the state and the execution of that will... these functions are, respectively, Politics and Administration." He conveniently assigns the functions of expressing the state will to politics and the execution of that will to administration.³³

As a philosophy of government and administration, the politics-administration dichotomy proposition thus provides an ethical basis for the behavior of bureaucracy in a democratic setting. Cariño points out that the premise gained acceptance because of four reasons: 1) it enshrined expertise and technical capabilities in the civil service and in the conduct of public administration; 2) it allowed the bureaucracy to be linked to democracy under the principle that elected officials who are legitimated through the electoral process make decisions for the state, with the bureaucracy accountable to the people through the political leaders; 3) the dichotomy lends credence to the label of members of the bureaucracy as "civil servants" who carry out the will of the people through the political leadership; and 4) it helps legitimize a system of administration in which appointments are not based on political

partisanship, loyalty or allegiance to any political interest or party but as a technical body.³⁴ If the politics-administration concept is therefore relevant at all to democratic societies, it is perhaps because of the moral premises it upholds and renders as overriding principles which bureaucracy must observe. Thus, the prevailing aspirations on political neutrality and independence, merit and fitness, accountability and technical competence of civil servants are manifestations of a century of value perspectives flowing from the ideal of a politics-administration dichotomy.

The operationalization of the concept however has proven to be problematic and unwieldy. The experience and realities of administration have shown the incompatibility of any such compartmentalization, that administrators cannot divorce themselves from the political ethos because this would mean a fragmentation of the dynamics of policy-making and execution. Waldo acknowledged that the politics-administration dichotomy is a "seriously erroneous description of reality, and as deficient, even pernicious, prescription for action."³⁵ Frederickson asserted in no uncertain terms that the dichotomy "lacks empirical warrant, for it is abundantly clear that administrators both execute and make policy."³⁶ Lambright likewise maintains that "the administrator is a participant in the political process, a politician in the sense that he must engage in conflict resolution, exercise discretion, and make decisions affecting competing claims."³⁷

Thus, for scores of reasons inherent in the political system, it has been conceded that administrators are constantly embroiled in political struggles.³⁸ Moreover, bureaucrats are not expected to behave in a mechanical or robotlike manner in the implementation of policy. They are part of the political system having their own values which they bring into the bureaucracy, and are thus, engaged in some form of political activity to protect their interests or that of their programs.³⁹

It is for these reasons that the politics-administration dichotomy concept has fallen out of grace during the past decades even if its value premises, particularly those on accountability, merit and fitness, and technical competence, continue to serve as normative aspirations of societies clinging to democratic ideals.

Resurgent Democracies, Bureaucratic Reform and Politics-Administration Dichotomy

In the face of the uncertainty as to the logical validity and relevance of the politics-administration dichotomy proposition, it would seem awkward and

inappropriate to prescribe it to resurgent democracies in their quest for bureaucratic reform and normalcy. The tragedy here however is that the reestablishment of democratic processes among the societies that suffered years of authoritarianism would be in need of a philosophy that would embody its ideals, not only in the general problematic of stabilization of government, but in drawing bureaucracy away from the lure of politicization. Resurgent democracies have to operate simultaneously within the traditions of liberalism, liberal democracy and political sociology. From the liberalist standpoint, it has to be preoccupied with the perspectives of order and sovereignty, which has serious implications on preservation and assertion of independence. The liberal democracy tradition on the other hand finds its place in the need to reinstall the aspirations of political and administrative accountability. The tradition of political sociology would have to figure prominently in the adoption of institutional mechanisms to carry out the will of the state which is premised on adherence to democratic principles of separation of powers, check and balances, alternance of power through the electoral process, establishment of basic freedoms, and sensitivity to citizen demands. Obviously, in the pursuit of these values, the environment of resurgent democracies will be conflictual, as policies attempting to uphold these traditions simultaneously become incompatible. These will have marked or residual effects on bureaucratic reform, as the new democracy goes about breaking the power structure which the administrative system enjoyed in the past regime.

If the redemocratization efforts were based on consensual transitions, the process may be less burdensome since the regime that gave bureaucracy the source of power and influence would be in better position to remove this through residual authority. If the transition occurs through regime breakdown, the new dispensation is bound to adopt measures that would on the whole be drastic and sweeping, and which, may temporarily paralyze administration, to the extent that it threatens normalization and gets in the way of instituting reforms.

To begin with, the problem of bureaucratic reform among resurgent democracies presents a myriad of dimensions and components that require swift, decisive intervention. Much of the problems that will confront the redemocratization process will revolve around such agenda as revising the organizational structure, institutional configurations and relationships, the power arrangements and the orientation of the bureaucracy.

Resurgent democracies will have to re-implant and re-institutionalize the structure of the bureaucracy along the lines offered under Figure 2, and until a new order is conceived, bureaucratic reform must take place, not unlike the ones that confronted the American experience in the 1880s, with the variation however that the new system comes at the heels of a previously authoritarian

regime. Unlike the American experience which set the stage for the politics-administration dichotomy aspiration, resurgent democracies may have to deal with bureaucrats and institutions that have not been necessarily treated as pawns or spoils of the political game, but rather a willing accomplice of a regime that gave it power and influence.

The first major agenda of administrative reform would understandably be towards redefinition of the functions and roles of the bureaucracy under the new dispensation, presumably within the framework of a democratic system premised upon a constitutional mandate and on separation of powers following the model in Figure 2. Reorganization of agencies, abolition, creation of new ones, merger and removal of bureaucrats deemed as corrupt and inept would naturally preoccupy the attention of government.⁴⁰

These however are structural and functional changes that modify the contours of the bureaucracy but does not at all yield much in the nature of substantive bureaucratic reform. These changes may be necessary but they consequently disturb careerism and may have dysfunctional effects on continuity, performance, and stabilization of the system, bringing in its wake alienation and disillusionment on the new government. A corollary effect is that the changes may result to a return to the untrammelled exercise of the patronage or the spoils system in that the new government may find it more convenient to relieve summarily bureaucrats who served the previous regime without regard to whether they participated actively in the entrenchment of the authoritarian regime or not. This does not at all provide a favorable climate and in fact, exacerbates partisanship that sets the stage for increased politicization of the bureaucracy. Aberbach and Rockman provide a useful description to illustrate the phenomenon:

...Politicization of the bureaucracy is normally thought to occur when the bureaucracy loses its independence to propose alternative choices and, especially, its ability to exercise discretionary choice in the context of rendering impartial and universalistic judgments of effectiveness within the context of prevailing laws. Bureaucracy also is thought to have become politicized *when administrative officials are required to meet litmus tests of loyalty to the governing authorities...* (italics supplied)⁴¹

Essentially, this sort of politicization differs from that with the authoritarian regime in the sense that in that context, again, using Aberbach and Rockman, bureaucrats may have assumed "roles that once were thought to be exclusively the province of politicians..." and where the bureaucracy "becomes the site for managing the politics of policy implementation."⁴²

A resurgent democracy, on the other hand, attempts to institute reform by way of removal of bureaucrats who are deemed to be corrupt, incompetent or identified with the previous dispensation, and in the process, sets the tone

for patronage which results in partisanship and loss of neutrality since: 1) bureaucrats would tend to be subservient to the new dispensation in the exercise of functions in order to be retained in office; and 2) the entry of new bureaucrats would be faced with the burden of proving themselves as worthy allies of the regime.

Obviously, this may be considered as passing aberrations that comes with the process of transition, but they create far reaching implications as normalization is developed. In a way, this sets a practice that may have ominous precedents for the future especially changes in political leadership by way of competitive elections. This attitude dangerously provides inroads for the advocacy of Jacksonian democracy where positions in the administrative system are treated as part of the 'spoils' of the ruling party.

It is thus, along these lines where resurgent democracies may find a useful function and meaning for the politics-administration dichotomy proposition. It may be conceded that administration may be embodied in some politicalization in the implementation or enforcement of policies, but it must have some semblance of independence instead of subservience to the political leadership. This visibly can be upheld if resurgent democracies take the pains to respect the career service, and pursue instead the difficult but more effective approach of changing bureaucratic outlook in the exercise of administrative power and functions. Through appropriate policy interventions consistent with the model under Fig. 2, and following liberal democratic traditions of accountability, resurgent democracies must have to "depoliticize" the bureaucracy by a marked return to the pursuit of policy implementation.

Recasting the Politics-Administration Dichotomy: In Search of an Alternative

The problem of the politics-administration dichotomy proposition is that it oversimplifies the antinomy between bureaucracy and politics, and sweepily regards politics as what Aberbach and Rockman describe as "commitment to partisan causes, to passion, and to serving parochial interest." In this classic sense, where politics is treated as the process of the allocation of power, influence and authority, the field essentially becomes a province of politicians and would be distasteful to aspirations of efficiency, impersonalism and pursuit of good administration. It is in this sense that American social science would deeply find itself unable to appreciate politics in administration, or administration in politics, mainly because of the stubborn notion that politics and the dynamics that go with it are antinomies to good administration. Thus, Waldo laments that while there have been numerous persuasions inugning the validity of politics-administration dichotomy, "we have made little progress in developing a 'formula' to replace it."⁴³

The alternative option for resurgent democracies is either to ignore the proposition completely, or to revise some of the premises that do not have "empirical warrant."

The option of completely discarding the dichotomy as useless and baseless leaves the reestablished democracy in search of a meaningful and viable philosophy with which it can pursue bureaucratic reform. This means that resurgent democracies must venture into an experiment of how to deal with bureaucratic reform, carrying with it the weight of uncertainty of how the bureaucracy will react and behave, and their effects on the governmental system as a whole. This will impose questions as the attitude of the new dispensation on civil service neutrality and independence, on careerism, political participation of bureaucrats in the affairs of legislation, administrative accountability, and administrative competence.

Obviously, a resurgent democracy is in search of a philosophy to reorient bureaucracies and provide the climate for reform without impairing continuity and the stability it seeks to establish. To begin with, resurgent democracies must begin to operate within a pluralist setting where the state will be confronted with the arduous task of having to reconcile competing interests and persuasions. A resurgent democracy must negotiate the tension of seeking that tenuous middle ground which could be approximated as centrist, oscillating from left to right, from adversity to favor. It will have to venture into something new and traditional at the same time, for it cannot altogether ignore the experience of the past, or be completely enslaved to it. A resurgent democracy is thus a balancing act that requires both admonition from the weaknesses of contemporary governance and accretion of perspective based on the challenges and demands of existing realities.

In this sense, the politics-administration dichotomy proposition may have to be recast or reformulated with the view of discovering that middle ground which provides a viable and useful legacy in enriching the perspectives of reform. The dichotomy can be appreciated in the following manner:

- 1) *A resurgent democracy must necessarily restore the principles of balance of power among the different branches of government, and as such, must have the appropriate formula to engender this. Faced with a bureaucratic organization that had enjoyed power and influence during the years of authoritarianism, the new dispensation must appreciate administrative reform by breaking this power and restoring bureaucracy to its rightful place in the affairs of government. Evidently, this must be based on the philosophy of "depoliticization," and can be made to operate through policy intervention based on a constitutional mandate. The politics-administration dichotomy proposition can serve as the very basis in establishing the criterion as to roles*

and functions, and by adhering to the legacies of the proposition, the resurgent democracy at the same time emasculates bureaucratic influence in substantive policy-making and strengthens it in matters of administration. Admittedly, this may not be an easy task because the parameters of segmentation may be ambiguous at certain points, but the important consideration is that a philosophy is established in delimiting bureaucratic power in matters of policy-making without removing from it the ability towards engendering good administration.

2) *The resurgent democracy can take stock of legacies observed and upheld in the dichotomy proposition as enduring contributions to good administration and thus, should be taken into account in the reform effort. This will include the following:*

Political Neutrality. This aspiration encompasses a difficult notion that is generally oversimplified into the understanding that administrative system must be separated absolutely from the "hurry and strife" of politics. As experience in democracies has remarkably shown, the bureaucracy is subject to the pressures of the political system and is not rigid. The prevailing connotation attached to the term however is 'non-partisanship' in the affairs of the political system, that the bureaucracy will persist regardless of whichever political party is in power. The reality is that bureaucracy must work with the ruling party to serve the ends of its policy, and at some instance, may even be used in perpetuating the ends of a political party. If resurgent democracies were to correct this, the most possible notion is to contain unbridled partisanship by upholding the independence of the administrative system through the recognition of traditional principles of security of tenure, merit and fitness, and accountability to the public instead of the party in power. Understandably, the new dispensation may have to work with the prospects of having a bureaucracy that disagrees with it, but then again, that would be the essence of inspiring neutrality. Resurgent democracies will have to operate on the assumption that they have to acquire the confidence of the administrative system, and if indications point otherwise, then the need to persuade bureaucracy to the validity of their cause would have to be engendered instead of adopting an adversary stance towards the administrative system.

Independence of the Bureaucracy. A related notion that goes hand in hand with political neutrality is having to foster the independence of bureaucracy in the exercise of duty and functions. While political pressures may continue to occupy the landscape of public administration in a resurgent democracy, there would have to be a need to observe and respect the independence of the bureaucracy from the political system. Again, the maxim of security of tenure would be the most viable policy that can help operationalize this, and resurgent

democracies would move in the correct direction if it takes stock of the errors of its predecessors. Bureaucracies and the programs they implement are government activities designed to dispense services, and not as tools to win an election.

Administrative Accountability. The adoption and enforcement of effective and efficient mechanisms for insuring administrative accountability should serve as a check for bureaucratic behavior and performance. It would be useful for fledging democracies to use the medium of feedback or, in the context of the Philippines, the notion of "people power" to control bureaucracy and help ensure its accountability to the constituency. A resurgent democracy would then have to disabuse itself from the notion that the bureaucracy is accountable to the ruling party, and must, therefore be subservient to the administration. In this regard, the resurgent democracy must have to recognize and respect the neutrality of bureaucracy, particularly in electoral contests, that the career system is not, and should not be used as a tool to enhance the position of the ruling party to win an election. An important consideration here is that, the delivery of government programs or any other activity of government, as well as government resources must not be used to influence voters, and that the bureaucracy that implements these must be free from political pressures.

There is of course the important aspect of containing graft and corruption, and inefficiency within the bureaucracy which must be settled squarely with some modicum of decisiveness, resolve and fairness. A bureaucracy that is recognized as "independent" must be prepared to be accountable at all times to the public, and in this context, a resurgent democracy may have to be more forceful in enforcing anti-graft mechanisms. In here, that delicate balance between control and initiative would again have to come into play, with administrators becoming the repository of responsibility, aside from the Audit body, in curbing bureaucratic rapacity or misfeasance.¹⁴

Careerism and Merit, and Security of Tenure. As have been strongly indicated in the previous discussion, a resurgent democracy would do well if it begins to foster and uphold the sanctity of the career service and the security of tenure that is based on a career system that is governed by technical rules and insulated from partisan politics. This is obviously difficult to accomplish and we can take stock of the experience of authoritarian rule. A civil service that is based on partisanship will be partisan, and will be woven into becoming subservient allies of the political leadership because they are left with no recourse but to be subservient. Thus, a resurgent democracy must take steps to foster the independence and integrity of the civil service, and this must be made clear not only by way of policy pronouncements, but by explicit acts and examples of the leadership.

3) Finally, *the politics-administration dichotomy proposition may serve as the basis for acknowledging that in a democratic society, administration cannot be insulated from the "hurry and strife" of politics*, and must therefore be prepared to anticipate pressures from the political system. This is a dilemma that will endure. The administrative system cannot aspire to be completely neutral from the political arena, but it can be given the choice to be independent, if the values of the dichotomy discussed above are given meaning and substance. The useful function of the dichotomy along these lines is that it provides direction and arouses sensitivity in strengthening bureaucracy towards the functions it must accomplish without denying that these same mechanisms (e.g., careerism, security of tenure) are acknowledged and anticipation of the impact of politics in administration. In this sense, bureaucratic reform, and the mechanisms or vehicles that may be designed to engender it must take into account, that bureaucracy is subject to the "hurry and strife" of political conflict, and must therefore be prepared to deal with this environment. This is not to suggest that bureaucracy must indulge into politics and the political game, but to concede to the reality that politics are part of administrative life, and that administrators have no other recourse but to be conversant with the rules of the game. The implication submitted here is that bureaucracy must be able to equip itself with the appropriate armor of policies to protect itself from incursions of political personalities who are in search of "whipping boys" to enhance popularity. Undoubtedly, a bureaucracy can be properly equipped if its ranks are manned by a competent staff who will be most knowledgeable of their work. Likewise, the bureaucracy would be prepared to meet a political "crisis" headlong if their tenure is secured and their positions protected from threats of legislative intervention.

Much of the above are in the order of aspirant propositions. They have been recognized as normative values that have been glossed over through the years because the difficulties of upholding, observing, implementing and enforcing are characteristically overwhelming, needing a good deal of political will and resolve. But redemocratization from the ashes of authoritarianism is precisely a matter of will and resolve in engendering a new order that substantiates and embodies the aspirations of the people. This precisely is the challenge of transition for which bureaucratic reform cannot be treated as merely incidental and passing, but an important component that has distinct impact on the success and future of the new order being carved.

Endnotes

¹See Donald Share, "Transitions to Democracy and Transition Through Transaction" in *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (January 1987), p. 525. Share cites the works of O'Donnell, *et. al.*, on *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe and Latin America* (Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1986); Share and Mainwaring, "Transitions through Transaction: Democratization in Brazil and Spain" in W.D. Selcher (ed.), *Political Liberalization in Brazil*

(Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1986); and Viola and Mainwaring "Transitions to Democracy: Brazil and Argentina in the 1980s" in *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Winter, 1985), among others. It is worthwhile to mention the studies of Herman and Petras, "Resurgent Democracy: Rhetoric and Reality" in *New Left Review*, No. 194 (November-December 1985).

²It may be inappropriate to include South Korea here under the regime of President Chun Doo Hwan and his designated heir apparent, Roh Tae Woo, (who won the first presidential elections last December 1987) but if recent events at the time of writing this paper are considered, and if Chun and Roh honor promised reforms made, then the regime can be conveniently classified as what Share calls as "consensual transitions," or those which enjoy the support and willingness of an authoritarian ruler to institute democratic reforms. See Share, *op. cit.*, pp. 528-534. For the recent account on democratic reforms in South Korea, see a detailed report in "About Face," *Time Magazine*, July 13, 1987, pp. 4-10.

³The problems and the different agenda that preoccupy transition governments are discussed more comprehensively in another paper, Danilo R. Reyes, "Social Services Policy in the Transition State: The Philippines and the Agenda of Social Reform," in *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XXXI, No. 1 (January 1987), pp. 1-23.

⁴See Guillermo O'Donnell, "Tensions in the Bureaucratic-authoritarian State and the Question of Democracy" in David Collier (ed.), *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 285-318; the models of corporatist and technocratic states are discussed in Jennifer Todd, "The Politics of the Public Service: Some Implications of Recent Theories of the State for the Analysis of Administrative Systems" in *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 10 (1982), pp. 353-366; See also Eva Etzioni-Halevy, *Bureaucracy and Democracy* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), Ch. 4 for a more comprehensive discussion. It is however interesting to note that the Philippines, for instance was labelled as a corporatist state in the early years of martial rule by Stauffer; Cariño, on the other hand, alluded to its being classified as "bureaucrat-authoritarian" during the fading years of the Marcos regime. See Robert Stauffer, "Philippine Corporatism" in *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XX, No. 3 (July 1976). and Ledivina V. Cariño "Philippine Public Administration: A Westernized System in an Authoritarian Asian Setting" (forthcoming).

⁵As understood in the context of this paper, politics-administration dichotomy grew out of the principles of administration enunciated in a paper written by Woodrow Wilson, then a young instructor in Political Science in 1887, and which was to become a major contribution to the disciplinary field of Public Administration in the United States. The proposition was later given fuller treatment by such scholars as Frank J. Goodnow and W. F. Willoughby. A discussion of this will be provided in succeeding sections of this study. See Wilson, "The Study of Administration," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 2 (June 1887), pp. 197-222. The article is reprinted in Dwight Waldo (ed.), *Ideas and Issues in Public Administration: A Book of Readings* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book, Co., Inc., 1953), Ch. 4, pp. 64-75; F.J. Goodnow, *Politics and Administration* (New York, 1900); and W.J. Willoughby, *The Government of Modern States* (New York, 1919).

⁶Thus, we have such scathing observations as those of W. Henry Lambright, "The Minnowbrook Perspective and the Future of Public Affairs: Public Administration Is Public-Policy Making" in Frank Marini (ed.) *Toward a New Public Administration: The Minnowbrook Perspective* (Scranton: Chandler Publishing Co., 1971), pp. 332-345, who asserts that "...politics-administration dichotomy is dead, but the ghost continues to haunt us, to narrow the vision of even those who take Public Administration seriously..." (p. 333). See also Fred Riggs, "The Interdependence of Politics and Administration," a paper delivered at the Conference of the American Society for Public Administration, Anaheim, California, April 1986, also published in the *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Volume XXXI, No. 4 (October 1987), pp. 418-438.

⁷David Held, "Central Perspectives on the Modern State" in David Held, *et. al.*, (eds.) *State and Societies* (New York and London: New York University Press, 1983), p. 1.

⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 2-3. Held offers an incisive discussion of these different traditions and their proponents. While it is possible that he may have omitted some perspective in that the concentration is on Western thought, the discussion at least provides a fitting background on the subject. It is not for this study however to be engrossed on the ramifications of these persuasions, but we have taken mild liberties to incorporate a synoptic view of these traditions to set our perspectives. The reader may refer to the original works of the philosophers identified as well as those not mentioned here owing to limitations in space. We recognize the fact that we may have done a disservice to other thinkers whose contribution to political theory are as important and as relevant as the ones mentioned. Another reference that provides a handy compendium which may be of interest to the reader is Ronald H. Chilcote, *Theories of Comparative Politics* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981).

⁹Chilcote, *ibid.*, p. 109.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 109-110.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 107.

¹²As cited in D.S. Pugh, D. J. Hickson and C. R. Hinnings, *Writers on Organizations* (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1971Z), p. 22. The original literature is Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1964); and *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, translated by Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1958).

¹³Martin Albrow, *Bureaucracy* (London: Pall Mall Press, Ltd., 1970), p. 85.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 84-105. Albrow offers a set of interpretations on modern bureaucracy which unfortunately cannot be comprehensively discussed in this paper because of space limitations and to avoid digressing into the realm of bureaucratic theory, which in itself alone, is a mass of concepts and premises.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 94.

¹⁶Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave, *Public Finance in Theory and Practice* (Tokyo: McGraw-Hill Kogakusha, 1973), pp. 3-72.

¹⁷Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), p. 32.

¹⁸Marcos Kaplan, "Recent Trends of the Nation-State in Contemporary Latin America," *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1985), pp. 89-90. A more simplistic view as to the functions of the state is that of Dimock and Dimock who suggested that the functions of the state can be classified into two: rule and service. See Marshall E. Dimock and Gladys O. Dimock, *Public Administration*, 3rd ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1964), p. 3.

¹⁹Etzioni-Halevy, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

²⁰For a discussion of post-revolutionary Nicaragua and the problems and policies adopted by the Sandinista regime particularly towards cotton production and agrarian reform, see the essay of Forest Colburn and Silvio de Franco "Privilege Production and Revolution: The Case of Nicaragua" in *Comparative Politics* (April 1985), pp. 277-290.

²¹In developing this concept, I was influenced with an earlier model conceived for the Department of Public Information in 1976 under the Marcos regime. This model however centered on identifying the information functions of the state.

²²Kaplan, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

²³Share, *op. cit.*, p. 60. Another useful study that gives insights on the nature of transitions is that of Eduardo Viola and Scott Mainwaring "Transitions to Democracy: Brazil and Argentina in the 1980s" *op. cit.*, pp. 193-220.

²⁴Viola and Mainwaring, *ibid.*, p. 197.

²⁵As cited in Ledivina V. Cariño, "The Dilemmas of Civil Servants in an Authoritarian State," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XXIX, No. 2 (April 1985), p. 124.

²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 125.

²⁶Kaplan, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

²⁶Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

³⁰William Morrow, *Public Administration, Politics and the Political System* (New York: Random House, 1975), p. 5; p. 3.

³¹A discussion of civil service reform in the United States is found in Felix A. Nigro and Lloyd G. Nigro, *The New Public Personnel Administration*, 3rd ed. (Illinois: F.E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1986), Ch. 1. See also Donald Klinger and John Nalbandian, *Public Personnel Management: Contexts and Strategies* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1985), Ch. 3. Fred Riggs offers an incisive analysis of the separation of politics and administration proposition and the premise of civil service reform under the Pendleton Act, in Riggs, "The Interdependence of Politics and ...," *op. cit.*

³²Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 71-72.

³³Goodnow, *op. cit.*, p. 22 as cited and discussed in Dwight Waldo, *The Administrative State* (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1948), pp. 106-108.

³⁴Cariño, "The Dilemmas of Civil Servants in an Authoritarian State," *op. cit.*, p. 121-122.

³⁶As cited in Riggs, *op. cit.*

³⁶H. George Frederickson, "Toward a New Public Administration" in Marini, *op. cit.*, p. 312.

³⁷Lambright, *op. cit.*

³⁸Morrow, *op. cit.*

³⁹Cariño, "The Dilemmas of Civil Servants....," *op. cit.*, p. 122, see also Morrow, *ibid.*

⁴⁰Herz provides an interesting discussion on processes involved in the reestablishment of democracy after the downfall of an authoritarian regime. He notes similarities of problems that range from what to do with the excesses of the previous regime, how to proceed with normalcy, and how to deal with corrupt bureaucrats. "Democracy After the Downfall of Authoritarian or Dictatorial Regimes," *Comparative Politics* (July 1978), pp. 559-562.

⁴¹Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman, "Comparative Administration, Methods, Muddles, and Models" in *Administration and Society*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (February 1987), p. 490. A very good example of course is the widescale removal of civil servants under the Aquino regime in 1986.

⁴²*Ibid.*

⁴³As cited in Riggs, *op. cit.*

⁴⁴Some of the problems of control and bureaucratic initiative have been discussed partly in an earlier paper. See Danilo R. Reyes, "Control Processes and Red Tape in Philippine Bureaucracy: Notes on Administrative Inefficiency," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XXVI, Nos. 3 & 4 (July-October 1982).